Bidder collusion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marshall, Robert C.; Marx, Leslie M.
• 署名单位: Duke University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 374-402
• 关键词: auction; bidding rings; cartel; shill

摘要

We analyze bidder collusion at first-price and second-price auctions. Our focus is on less than all-inclusive cartels and collusive mechanisms that do not rely on auction outcomes. We show that cartels that cannot control the bids of their members can eliminate all ring competition at second-price auctions, but not at first-price auctions. At first-price auctions, when the cartel cannot control members' bids, cartel behavior involves multiple cartel bids. Cartels that can control bids of their members can suppress all ring competition at both second-price and first-price auctions; however, shill bidding reduces the profitability of collusion at first-price auctions. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.