On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McAdams, David
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 729-732
• 关键词: uniform-price auction; MONOTONICITY; INDEPENDENCE; affiliation; risk-neutrality; risk-aversion

摘要

Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.