Credulity, lies, and costly talk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kartik, Navin; Ottaviani, Marco; Squintani, Francesco
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of London; London Business School; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 93-116
• 关键词: Signaling; cheap talk; misreporting costs; Lying; deception; Naive receivers; inflated communication; full revelation

摘要

This paper studies a model of strategic communication by an informed and upwardly biased sender to one or more receivers. Applications include situations in which (i) it is costly for the sender to misrepresent information, due to legal, technological, or moral constraints, or (ii) receivers may be credulous and blindly believe the sender's recommendation. In contrast to the predictions obtained in the benchmark cheap talk model, our model admits a fully separating equilibrium, provided that the state space is unbounded above. The language used in equilibrium is inflated and naive receivers are deceived. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.