Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vartiainen, Hannu
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 111-126
• 关键词: subgame perfect equilibrium; implementation; characterization

摘要

Moore and Repullo [Subgame perfect implementation, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1191-1220], and Abreu and Sen [Subgame perfect implementation: a necessary and almost sufficient condition, J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990) 285-299] introduce distinct necessary and sufficient conditions for SPE implementation, when the number of players is at least three. This paper closes the gap between the conditions-a complete characterization of the SPE implementable choice rules is provided. The characterization consists of alpha*, which strengthens alpha of Abreu-Sen by adding it a restricted veto-power condition, and the unanimity condition. Under strict preferences alpha* is equal to alpha. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.