Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Han, Seungjin
• 署名单位: McMaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.013
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 610-626
• 关键词: robust equilibrium; competing-mechanism games; multiple principals and multiple agents

摘要

This paper formulates the notion of a strongly robust equilibrium relative to a set of mechanisms specified in any competing-mechanism game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple agents. It shows that when agents' efforts are contractible, any strongly robust pure-strategy equilibrium relative to single-incentive contracts persists, regardless of the continuation equilibrium that agents play upon any principal's deviation to any complex mechanism. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.