Directed search with multiple job applications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Galenianos, Manolis; Kircher, Philipp
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.007
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 445-471
• 关键词: Directed search; Multiple applications; portfolio choice

摘要

We develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. Our main theoretical contribution is to integrate the portfolio choice problem faced by workers into an equilibrium framework. All equilibria of our model exhibit wage dispersion. Consistent with stylized facts, the density of wages is decreasing and higher wage firms receive more applications per vacancy. Unlike most models of directed search, the equilibria are not constrained efficient. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.