Structural holes in social networks: A remark

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Houy, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.007
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 422-431
• 关键词: NETWORKS; network formation; Structural holes; intermediation

摘要

In a recent article, [S. Goyal, F. Vega-Redondo, Structural holes in social networks, J. Econ. Theory 137 (1) (2007) 460-492] the authors (GVR) showed the importance of stars and cycles in a given network formation game. Implicitly, in their article, a network is called an equilibrium if it is generated by an equilibrium strategy. We extend the results of GVR to the case of a stronger requirement: namely, that a network can be called an equilibrium only if all the strategies generating it are equilibria. We also show, in a dynamic framework, that both definitions differ in crucial ways. (C) 2008 Published by Elsevier Inc.