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作者：Oyarzun, Carlos; Sarin, Rajiv
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of Birmingham
摘要：We study how learning shapes behavior towards risk when individuals are not assumed to know, or to have beliefs about, probability distributions. In any period, the behavior change induced by learning is assumed to depend on the action chosen and the payoff obtained. We characterize learning processes that, in expected value, increase the probability of choosing the safest actions and provide sufficient conditions for them to converge to the choices of risk averse expected utility maximizers. ...
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作者：Arawataria, Ryo; Ono, Tetsuo
作者单位：Nagoya University; University of Osaka
摘要：This paper develops a model where income inequality and intergenerational mobility are jointly determined via redistributive politics. The model includes two key factors: accessibility of tertiary education for poor-born agents and multiple self-fulfilling expectations of agents. Given these factors, the model provides predictions of cross-country differences in inequality and mobility consistent with empirical observations. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We characterize the boundaries of the set of transfers (external transfers) implementing a given allocation rule without imposing any assumptions on the agent's type space or utility function besides quasi-linearity. Exploiting the concept of external transfers allows us to obtain an exact characterization of the set of implementable allocation rules (the set of transfers is non-empty) and the set of allocation rules satisfying Revenue Equivalence (the extremal transfers coincide). We then sho...
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作者：Schumacher, Heiner
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with the option to maintain or to quit relationships. We show that if agents imitate successful strategies infrequently, defection is not dynamically stable and cooperation emerges regardless of the initial distribution of strategies. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Shi, Fei
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
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作者：Sato, Shin
作者单位：Fukuoka University
摘要：I consider whether the agents' reluctance to make a large lie is helpful for the rule designer to construct a nonmanipulable rule. For this purpose, I study an axiom, called AM-proofness, saying that manipulation cannot occur through preferences adjacent to the sincere one. Through examples, I give rationales for AM-proofness. My main result is a sufficient condition on a domain for the equivalence of AM-proofness and strategy-proofness. I show that the sufficient condition is satisfied by the...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bielefeld
摘要：We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand. (C)...
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作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Ye, Lixin
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize (socially) efficient and (revenue) optimal two-stage mechanisms, with the first stage being an entry right allocation mechanism and the second stage being a traditional private good provision mechanism. Both efficiency and revenue optimality require that the second-stage selling mechanism be ex post efficient and the number of entry slots be endogenously determined. We show that both efficient and optimal entry ...
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作者：Ueda, Kenichi
作者单位：International Monetary Fund
摘要：Competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality. Following Arrow and Debreu (1954) [6], I formulate a standard growth model with externality a two-period version of Romer (1986) [39]-as a game among consumers, firms, and intermediaries. The Walrasian equilibrium, with an auctioneer, does not achieve the social optimum. Without an auctioneer or intermediaries, I show that no Nash equilibrium exists. With several banks strategically intermediating...
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作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Tan, Xu
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A set of voters consults experts before voting over two alternatives. Experts observe private signals about the values of the alternatives and can reveal their information or conceal it, but cannot lie. We examine how disclosure and voting vary with preference biases, signal precision, and the voting rule. Unanimity rule can lead to greater information revelation and total utility than simple majority rule. The voting rule that maximizes information disclosure need not coincide with the voting...
