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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper studies the phenomenon of early hiring in entry-level labor markets affected by social networks. We offer a model in which information is revealed over time. At first, workers have noisy information about their own ability. The early information is 'soft' and non-verifiable, and workers can convey the information credibly only to firms that are connected to them. Later on, 'hard' accurate verifiable information becomes available. We characterize the effects of changes to the network...
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作者：Sattinger, Michael
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：This paper develops a model of safety first consumption behavior in which the likelihood of survival to the next period depends on current consumption levels. Below a threshold asset level, individuals follow a decumulation path, and above that level they follow an accumulation path. Saving rates then vary discontinuously with asset level, generating a poverty trap and divergence in incomes. An increase in the likelihood of surviving raises aggregate saving. A more equitable distribution of as...
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作者：Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Koc University; Northwestern University
摘要：We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily...
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作者：Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Ely, Jeffrey C.
作者单位：University of Queensland; Northwestern University
摘要：We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. We obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility based on the Mirrlees representation of the indirect utility and a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule, which pin down the range of possible payoffs as a function of the allocation rule. To illustrate our approach we derive the optimal selling mecha...
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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Bonn
摘要：The paper introduces a notion of complementarity (substitutability) of two signals which requires that in all decision problems each signal becomes more (less) valuable when the other signal becomes available. We provide a general characterization which relates complementarity and substitutability to a Blackwell comparison of two auxiliary signals. In a setting with a binary state space and binary signals, we find an explicit characterization that permits an intuitive interpretation of complem...
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作者：Donaldson, John B.; Gershun, Natalia; Giannoni, Marc P.
作者单位：Columbia University; Pace University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We consider a simple real business cycle model in which shareholders hire self-interested executives to manage their firm. A generic family of compensation contracts similar to those employed in practice is studied. When compensation is convex in the firm's dividend, an increase in the firm's output results in a more than proportional increase in the managers' income. Incentive contracts of sufficient yet modest convexity are shown to result in an indeterminate general equilibrium, one in whic...
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作者：Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：Partial equilibrium analysis has a conceptual dilemma that its object should be negligibly small in order to be free from income effect but then the consumer does not care for it and the notion of willingness to pay for it does not make sense. In the setting of a continuum of commodities, we propose a limiting procedure which transforms the general many-commodity framework into a partial single-commodity framework. In the limit, willingness to pay for a commodity is established as a density no...
