Extremal incentive compatible transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.012
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 134-164
• 关键词: Incentive compatibility; revenue equivalence; budget balance; mechanism design

摘要

We characterize the boundaries of the set of transfers (external transfers) implementing a given allocation rule without imposing any assumptions on the agent's type space or utility function besides quasi-linearity. Exploiting the concept of external transfers allows us to obtain an exact characterization of the set of implementable allocation rules (the set of transfers is non-empty) and the set of allocation rules satisfying Revenue Equivalence (the extremal transfers coincide). We then show how the extremal transfers can be put to use in mechanism design problems where Revenue Equivalence does not hold. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.