A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sato, Shin
• 署名单位: Fukuoka University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.001
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 259-278
• 关键词: Adjacent manipulation; AM-proofness; single-peaked preferences; strategy-proofness

摘要

I consider whether the agents' reluctance to make a large lie is helpful for the rule designer to construct a nonmanipulable rule. For this purpose, I study an axiom, called AM-proofness, saying that manipulation cannot occur through preferences adjacent to the sincere one. Through examples, I give rationales for AM-proofness. My main result is a sufficient condition on a domain for the equivalence of AM-proofness and strategy-proofness. I show that the sufficient condition is satisfied by the universal domain and the domain of single-peaked preferences. Over such domains, all results about strategy-proofness can be restated with AM-proofness. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.