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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, and display excess response to the aggregate shocks, as in Lucas [14]. For any given variance of aggregate shocks, the upper bound on aggregate volatility is linearly increasing in th...
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作者：Hu, Audrey; Zou, Liang
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We analyze sequential auctions in a general environment where bidders are heterogeneous in risk exposures and exhibit non-quasilinear utilities. We derive a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium for the sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions respectively, with an arbitrary number of identical objects for sale. When bidders are risk averse (preferring), the equilibrium price sequences must be downward (upward) drifting. The declining price anomaly is thus evidence of bidder risk aversion in this g...
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作者：Rondina, Giacomo; Shim, Myungkyu
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：In the context of a large Cournot market with dispersedly informed firms, we show that while output decisions are strategic substitutes, private information acquisition decisions can be strategic complements. The reversal of incentives operates through the informational role played by the price of a financial asset whose payoff depends on firms' output decisions. Our results rely on a novel mechanism whereby, holding fixed the private information of financial traders, when firms become more pr...
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作者：Faro, Jose Heleno
作者单位：Insper
摘要：This paper characterizes variational Bewley preferences over Anscombe and Aumann acts, a class of binary relations that may fail completeness or transitivity vis a vis independence. The main result gives an axiomatization of preference relations greater than or similar to represented as follows: f greater than or similar to g double left right arrow integral u(f) dp + eta(p) >= integral u (g) dp for all p is an element of Delta, where u is an affine utility index over a convex set X of consequ...
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作者：Chandrasekher, Madhav
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies preference aggregation in a dynamic choice context. Voters face menus of options in stages and the source of dynamics is that menus possibly get smaller across each stage. We call the family of stage voting rules dynamic voting rules and provide an axiomatic characterization, on the domain of single-peaked preferences, of dynamic voting rules that are strategy-proof and satisfy a second property, inspired from choice theory, which we call dynamic consistency. (C) 2015 Elsevi...
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作者：Levy, Yehuda John
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：A long-standing open question raised in the seminal paper of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) is whether or not the play of a repeated game, in the rational learning model introduced there, must eventually resemble the play of exact equilibria, and not just the play of approximate equilibria as demonstrated there. This' paper shows that play may remain distant in fact, mutually singular from the play of any equilibrium of the repeated game. We further show that the same inaccessibility holds in Bayesia...
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作者：Nakamura, Yutaka
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：The mean-variance utility postulates that random variables with the same mean and variance should be equally desirable. This paper presents and discusses necessary and sufficient preference-based axioms for the existence of mean-variance utility in which any condition on variances but mean-values is not explicitly specified. Furthermore, we investigate necessary and sufficient axioms for four types of additively separable forms of mean and variance in the utility representation. (C) 2015 Elsev...
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作者：Rosar, Frank
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：A group of strategic agents with diverse private information and interdependent preferences has to take a continuous collective decision. I study the design of the decision-making procedure from the viewpoint of a utilitarian social planner. For uniformly distributed information, the implementation of the average report as decision dominates the implementation of the median report when the set of admissible reports is optimally designed. This is true for any number of agents and for any degree...
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作者：Farhi, Emmanuel; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Parties in financial markets, industries, compensation design or politics may negotiate on either a piecemeal or a bundled basis. Little is known about the desirability of bundling when values are common and/or information endogenous. The paper shows that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby facilitating trade. It accordingly revisits and qualifies existing knowledge on security design. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：The value of information is examined in a single-agent environment with unawareness. Although the agent has a correct prior about events he is aware of and has a clear understanding of his available actions and payoffs, his unawareness may lead him to commit information processing errors and to behave suboptimally. As a result, the value of information can be negative, contrasting what is true in the standard model with partitional information and no unawareness. We show that the source of the...
