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作者：Peters, Michael
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper models competing mechanism games as extensive-form games where the extensive form is incompletely understood by a modeler, typically because the modeler doesn't see all the messages that are being exchanged and doesn't understand all the contracts that can be enforced. For this reason, the revelation principle can't be used to characterize supportable outcomes. The paper provides a relatively weak restriction, referred to as regularity, on the unknown part the competing mechanism ga...
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作者：Kolb, Aaron M.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：A player of privately known strength chooses when to enter a market, and an incumbent chooses whether to compete or concede. Information about the potential entrant's type is revealed publicly according to an exogenous news process and the timing of entry. I analyze stationary equilibria using the public belief as a state variable. No equilibria in pure strategies exist, and smooth-pasting conditions need not hold. Under both D1 and a novel refinement, the informed player has nondecreasing val...
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作者：Bianchi, Milo; Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Paris School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：We model a financial market in which companies engage in strategic financial reporting knowing that investors only pay attention to a randomly drawn sample from firms' reports and extrapolate from this sample. We investigate the extent to which stock prices differ from the fundamental values, assuming that companies must report all their activities but are otherwise free to disaggregate their reports as they wish. We show that no matter how large the samples considered by investors are, a mono...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism for time separable allocation problems in continuous time. The willingness-to-pay of each agent is private information and changes over time. We derive the dynamic revenue-maximizing mechanism, analyze its qualitative structure and frequently derive its closed form solution. In the leading example of repeat sales of a good or service, we establish that commonly observed contract features such as flat rates, free consumption units and two-part ta...
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作者：Chan, Jimmy; Zhang, Wenzhang
作者单位：Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms. The mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition, and the main features are broadly consistent with common cartel practice identified by Harrington and Skrzypacz [24]. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ouazad, Amine
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：The paper presents a dynamic model of neighborhood segregation where fee motivated real estate brokers match sellers optimally either to minority or to white buyers. In an initially all-white neighborhood, real estate brokers thus either keep the neighborhood in a steady-state white equilibrium or trigger racial transition by matching sellers to minority buyers, a process called blockbusting. Racial transition leads to a higher rate of property turnover in the neighborhood once the fraction of...
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作者：Minardi, Stefania; Savochkin, Andrei
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; New Economic School
摘要：Departing from the traditional approach of modeling indecisiveness based on the weakening of the completeness axiom, we introduce the notion of graded preferences: The agent is characterized by a binary relation over (ordered) pairs of alternatives, which allows her to express her inclination to prefer one alternative over another and her confidence in the relative superiority of the indicated alternative. In the classical Anscombe-Aumann framework, we derive a representation of a graded prefe...
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作者：Di Pei, Harry
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I develop a theory of communication in which a sender gathers costly information before giving advice to a receiver. In a general setting, I show that the sender always communicates all her information to the receiver in every equilibrium. In the uniform-quadratic model in which the sender can choose any finite partition as her information structure, an upwardly biased sender can convey more precise information when recommending a larger action. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Szkup, Michal; Trevino, Isabel
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We study costly information acquisition in global games of regime change (that is, coordination games where payoffs are discontinuous in the unobserved state and in the agents' average action). We show that only symmetric equilibria exist and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness. We then characterize the value of information in these games and link it to the underlying parameters of the model. We investigate equilibrium efficiency, complementarities in information choices, and the trad...
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作者：Bognar, Katalin; Boergers, Tilman; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study optimal dynamic voting procedures when voting is costly. For a highly stylized specification of our model with private values, two alternatives, and binary, equally likely types we show the optimality of a voting procedure that combines two main elements: (i) there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and abstention is interpreted as a vote in favor of the default; (ii) voting is sequential and is terminated when a supermajority requirement, which declines over time, is met. We s...
