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作者：Lambson, Val; van den Berghe, John
作者单位：Brigham Young University; University of Chicago
摘要：We present a win-loss game between players with explicitly-modeled cognitive limitations. Differences in the players' abilities to analyze the available moves induce preferences over the complexity of the environment and hence incentives to manipulate that complexity. Other things equal, higher-skill players are more likely to win. In a class of long-horizon games with constant complexity, greater complexity reduces the advantage of the higher-skill player when the higher-skill player is the l...
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作者：Allouch, Nizar
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors' provisions. We present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for general networks and best-reply functions. In addition, we investigate the neutrality result of Wan [38] and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian [6] whereby consumers are able to undo the impact of income redistribution as well as public provision fi...
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作者：Araujo, Luis; Guimaraes, Bernardo
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Michigan State University
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium selection in intertemporal coordination problems with delay options. The risk-dominant action of the underlying one-shot game is selected when frictions are arbitrarily small. Larger frictions introduce real option effects in the model and inhibit coordination. (c) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dobzinski, Shahar; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study environments with m homogenous items and two bidders, where the private information of each bidder consists of a monotone valuation (multi-unit auctions). We analyze ex-post implementable social choice functions where the dominant strategy of a bidder is to reveal his valuation. A result by Green and Laffont [8] implies that an efficient outcome can only be ex-post implemented by VCG payments. However, the VCG mechanism has well-known drawbacks, such as low revenue and computational i...
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作者：Eeckhout, Jan; Weng, Xi
作者单位：University of London; University College London; ICREA; Peking University
摘要：In many economic environments, agents often continue to learn about the same underlying state variable, even if they switch action. For example, a worker's ability revealed in one job or when unemployed is informative about her productivity in another job. We analyze a general setup of experimentation with common values, and show that in addition to the well-known conditions of value matching (level) and smooth pasting (first derivative), this implies that the second derivatives of the value f...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Romm, Assaf
作者单位：Yale University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In complete information games, Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) and Borgers (1994) have proposed the solution concept (SW)-W-infinity (one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies), motivating it by a characterization in terms of approximate common certainty of admissibility. We examine the validity of this characterization of (SW)-W-infinity in an incomplete information setting. We argue that in Bayesian games with a nontr...
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作者：Challe, Edouard; Chretien, Edouard
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); European Central Bank; Bank of France
摘要：We analyse the joint determination of price informativeness and the composition of the market by order type in a large asset market with dispersed information. The market microstructure is one in which informed traders may place market orders or full demand schedules and where market makers set the price. Market-order traders trade less aggressively on their information and thus reduce the informativeness of the price; in a full market-order market, price informativeness is bounded, whatever t...
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作者：Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Koc University; Boston College
摘要：We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage-game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage-game actions of player one perfectly. Player one's type is private information and he may be a commitment type, drawn from a countable set of commitment types, who is locked into playing a particular strategy. Under a full-support assumption on the monitoring structu...
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作者：Roughgarden, Tim; Schoppmann, Florian
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Congestion games are multi-player games in which players' costs are additive over a set of resources that have anonymous cost functions, with pure strategies corresponding to certain subsets of resources. In a splittable congestion game, each player can choose a convex combination of subsets of resources. We characterize the worst-case price of anarchy a quantitative measure of the inefficiency of equilibria in splittable congestion games. Our approximation guarantee is parameterized by the se...
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作者：Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Kaas, Leo
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Konstanz
摘要：We analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market. We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different abilities, which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts, promoting high-ability workers only....
