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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, S.; Maccheroni, F.; Marinacci, M.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We extend the Fundamental Theorem of Finance and the Pricing Rule Representation Theorem to the case in which market frictions are taken into account but the Put Call Parity is still assumed to hold. In turn, we obtain a representation of the pricing rule as a discounted expectation with respect to a nonadditive risk neutral probability. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Evans, Robert; Reiche, Soenje
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if, having observed the agent's contract choice, the principal can offer a new menu of contracts in its place. An outcome function can be implemented in this setting if and only if it is optimal for the principal for some belief over agent t...
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作者：Reffgen, Alexander
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we argue that these domains are appropriate to represent preferences over political parties. Second, we define a domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences based on the condition of value-restric...
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Huck, Steffen; Oprea, Ryan; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of London; University College London; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Essex
摘要：We explore the stability of imitation in a 1200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff function but see the output quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, our oligopolies reach highly competitive levels within 50 periods. However, already after 100 periods, quantities start to drop and eventually fall deep into collusive territory without pausing at the Nash equilibri...
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作者：Anderson, Axel
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：This paper considers a dynamic matching model in which each agent's future productivity depends in part on their current match, as in labor markets, schooling, intergenerational marriage markets, and other environments. The Planner's endogenous rankings of human distributions are characterized. These Planner rankings are then used to develop sufficient conditions for positive assortative matching to be dynamically efficient. One lesson that emerges is that complementarity assumptions alone are...
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作者：Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper considers dynamic implementation problems in environments with changing private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if it is correctly implemented an arbitrary large number of times with arbitrary high probability in all (communication) equilibria. We show that if a social choice function is strictly efficient in the set of social choice functions that satisfy an undetectability condition, then it is approximately impl...
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作者：Salomon, Antoine; Forges, Francoise
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We consider two-person undiscounted and discounted infinitely repeated games in which every player privately knows his own payoffs (private values). Under a further assumption (existence of uniform punishment strategies), the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian infinitely repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria. This characterization does not apply to discounted games with sufficiently patient players. We show that in a class of public...
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作者：Mongin, Philippe; Pivato, Marcus
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Trent University; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We introduce a ranking of multidimensional alternatives, including uncertain prospects as a particular case, when these objects can be given a matrix form. This ranking is separable in terms of rows and columns, and continuous and monotonic in the basic quantities. Owing to the theory of additive separability developed here, we derive very precise numerical representations over a large class of domains (i.e., typically not of the Cartesian product form). We apply these representations to (1) s...
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作者：Devanur, Nikhil R.; Hartline, Jason D.; Yan, Qiqi
作者单位：Microsoft; Northwestern University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn independently from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is given by Myerson [1] as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free mechanism design and analysis. A good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal mechanism for the distrib...
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作者：Lippi, Francesco; Ragni, Stefania; Trachter, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Sassari; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We study the optimal anticipated policy in a pure-currency economy with flexible prices and a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. The economy features a business cycle and lump-sum monetary injections have distributional effects that depend on the state of the cycle. We parsimoniously characterize the dynamics of the economy and study the optimal regulation of the money supply as a function of the state under commitment. The optimal policy prescribes monetary expansions in recession...
