Liquid bundles

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Farhi, Emmanuel; Tirole, Jean
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.002
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 634-655
• 关键词: liquidity; security design; tranching; information acquisition

摘要

Parties in financial markets, industries, compensation design or politics may negotiate on either a piecemeal or a bundled basis. Little is known about the desirability of bundling when values are common and/or information endogenous. The paper shows that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby facilitating trade. It accordingly revisits and qualifies existing knowledge on security design. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.