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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：University of Tokyo; National University of Singapore
摘要：In a setting where an infinite population of players interact locally and repeatedly, we study the impacts of payoff structures and network structures on contagion of a convention beyond 2 x 2 coordination games. First, we consider the bilingual game, where each player chooses one of two conventions or adopts both (i.e., chooses the bilingual option) at an additional cost. For this game, we completely characterize when a convention spreads contagiously from a finite subset of players to the en...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
摘要：In random incentive mechanisms agents choose from multiple problems and a randomization device selects a single problem to determine payment. Agents are assumed to act as if they faced each problem on its own. While this approach is valid when agents are expected utility maximizers, ambiguity-averse agents may use the randomization device to hedge and thereby contaminate the data. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Codognato, Giulio; Ghosal, Sayantan; Tonin, Simone
作者单位：University of Udine; University of Glasgow
摘要：In a bilateral oligopoly, with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part, when is there a nonempty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations? Using a two-commodity version of the Shapley window model, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount of one of the two commodities. We provide four examples which show that this ch...
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作者：Erlanson, Albin; Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Southern Denmark
摘要：We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof, unanimous, consistent, and...
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作者：Strulovici, Bruno; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Studies of dynamic economic models often rely on each agent having a smooth value function and a well-defined optimal strategy. For time-homogeneous optimal control problems with a one-dimensional diffusion, we prove that the corresponding value function must be twice continuously differentiable under Lipschitz, growth, and non-vanishing-volatility conditions. Under similar conditions, the value function of any optimal stopping problem is shown to be (once) continuously differentiable. We also...
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作者：Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：Making a choice between multidimensional alternatives is a difficult task. Therefore, a decision maker may adopt some procedure (heuristic) to simplify this task. We provide an axiomatic model of one such heuristic called the Intra-Dimensional Comparison (DC) heuristic. The DC heuristic is well-documented in the experimental literature on choice under risk. The DC heuristic is a procedure in which a decision maker compares multidimensional alternatives dimension-by-dimension and makes a decisi...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Kalai, Ehud
作者单位：Yale University; Northwestern University
摘要：Bayesian Nash equilibria that fail to be hindsight-(or, alternatively, ex-post) stable do not provide reliable predictions of outcomes of games in many applications. We characterize a family of large Bayesian games (with many players) in which all equilibria are asymptotically hindsight-stable, and discuss the consequences of this robustness property. In contrast to earlier literature, we establish hindsight stability in a class of games in which players are not anonymous and type spaces and a...
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作者：Fabbri, Giorgio; Faggian, Silvia; Freni, Giuseppe
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Parthenope University Naples
摘要：The paper provides a continuous-time version of the discrete-time Mitra-Wan model of optimal forest management, where trees are harvested to maximize the utility of timber flow over an infinite time horizon. The available trees and the other parameters of the problem vary continuously with respect to both time and age of the trees, so that the system is ruled by a partial differential equation. The behavior of optimal or maximal couples is classified in the cases of linear, concave or strictly...
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作者：Caragiannis, Ioannis; Kaklamanis, Christos; Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis; Kyropoulou, Maria; Lucier, Brendan; Leme, Renato Paes; Tardos, Eva
作者单位：University of Patras; University of Patras; University of Oxford; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Cornell University
摘要：The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for monetizing the use of the Internet. It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise. Edelman et al. (2007) [11] and Varian (2007) [36] show that an efficient equilibrium always exists in the full information setting. Their results, however, do not extend to the case with uncertainty, where efficient equilibria might not exist. In this paper we study...
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作者：Schnakenberg, Keith E.
作者单位：University of Kentucky
摘要：I provide a theory of information transmission in collective choice settings. In the model, an expert has private information on the effect of a policy proposal and communicates to a set of voters prior to a vote over whether or not to implement the proposal. In contrast to previous game-theoretic models of political communication, the results apply to situations involving multiple voters, multidimensional policy spaces and a broad class of voting rules. The results highlight how experts can u...
