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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare theorems and, when agents' utilities are concave in venture participation, show that competitive equilibria exist, correspond to stable outcomes, and yield core outcomes. Competitive equilibria exist in our setting even when externalit...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：I propose a relevance-based independence axiom on how to aggregate individual yes/no judgments on given propositions into collective judgments: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people's judgments on propositions which are relevant to that proposition. This axiom contrasts with the classical independence axiom: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people's judgments on the same proposition. I generalize the premise-based rule and the sequential-priori...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Weber, Richard
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Cambridge
摘要：In a model introduced by Weitzman an agent called Pandora opens boxes sequentially, in whatever order she likes, discovers prizes within, and optimally stops. Her aim is to maximize the expected value of the greatest discovered prize, minus the costs of opening the boxes. The solution, using the so-called Pandora rule, is attractive and has many applications. However, it does not address applications in which the payoff depends on all discovered prizes, rather than just the best of them, nor i...
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作者：Wu, Qinggong
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：I study a model in which a finite number of men and women look for future spouses via random pairwise meetings. The central question is whether equilibrium marriage outcomes are stable matchings when search frictions are small. The answer is they can but need not be. For any stable matching there is an equilibrium leading to it almost surely. However there may also be equilibria leading to an unstable matching almost surely. A restriction to simpler strategies or to markets with aligned prefer...
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作者：Oury, Marion
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social planner is not entirely sure of the validity of his model and thus wants the social choice function to be not only (partially) implemented at all types of the initial model, but also at all types close to those types. In addition, we assume that the social planner also has some doubts on the payoffs of the outcomes and thus wants his prediction to be robust when these payoffs are close but not exactly e...
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作者：McAdams, David
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University
摘要：Consider a second-price auction with costly bidding in which bidders with i.i.d. private values have multiple opportunities to bid. If bids are observable, the resulting dynamic-bidding game generates greater expected total welfare than if bids were sealed, for any given reserve price. Making early bids observable allows high-value bidders to signal their strength and deter others from entering the auction. Nonetheless, as long as the seller can commit to a reserve price, expected revenue is h...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Aizu
摘要：This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations of observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock paper scissors). Furthermore, we provide natural conditions on game...
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作者：Menzio, Guido; Trachter, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：The paper studies equilibrium pricing in a product market for an indivisible good where buyers search for sellers. Buyers search sequentially for sellers but do not meet every seller with the same probability. Specifically, a fraction of the buyers' meetings lead to one particular large seller, while the remaining meetings lead to one of continuum of small sellers. In this environment, the small sellers would like to set a price that makes the buyers indifferent between purchasing the good and...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：In experiments, subjects are often not indifferent among all sources of uncertainty; between two prospects yielding the same distribution of monetary rewards, they may strictly prefer one over the other. We formulate a special case of ce-maxmin expected utility theory in a Savage setting, show that every decision maker perceives multiple subjective sources, and that source-utilities are rank dependent expected utility. A power series identifies each source, measures source-uncertainty, and det...
