Dynamically consistent voting rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chandrasekher, Madhav
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.012
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 175-187
• 关键词: Aggregation of preferences; dynamic consistency; strategy-proofness

摘要

This paper studies preference aggregation in a dynamic choice context. Voters face menus of options in stages and the source of dynamics is that menus possibly get smaller across each stage. We call the family of stage voting rules dynamic voting rules and provide an axiomatic characterization, on the domain of single-peaked preferences, of dynamic voting rules that are strategy-proof and satisfy a second property, inspired from choice theory, which we call dynamic consistency. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.