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作者：Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans; Mueller, Juerg
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We examine the validity of a macroeconomic version of the Modigliani Miller theorem. By this, we mean that different capital structures can occur in equilibrium and that all of them are associated with the same allocation of commodities and the same welfare. We develop a general equilibrium model with two production sectors, risk-averse households, and financial intermediation by banks. Banks are funded by (safe) deposits and (outside) equity and monitor borrowers in lending. Two sets of equil...
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作者：Nava, Francesco
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：The paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades. A model is presented in which the identity of buyers, of sellers, and of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade flows in the economy. The analysis first considers small economies, and provides sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence, a characterization of prices and flows, and some negative results relating welfare to network structure. The second and central pa...
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作者：Adlakha, Sachin; Johari, Ramesh; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University; Columbia University
摘要：In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well known that MPE computation becomes intractable as the number of players increases. We instead consider the notion of stationary equilibrium (SE), where players optimize assuming the empirical distribution of others' states remains constant at its long run avera...
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作者：Grout, Paul A.; Mitraille, Sebastien; Sonderegger, Silvia
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Bristol; Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Universite de Toulouse; TBS Education; University of Nottingham
摘要：We consider a setup where agents care about i) taking actions that are close to their preferences, and ii) coordinating with others. The preferences of agents in the same group are drawn from the same distribution. Each individual is exogenously matched with other agents randomly selected from the population. Starting from an environment where everyone belongs to the same group, we show that introducing agents from a different group (whose preferences are uncorrelated with those of each of the...
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作者：Iachan, Felipe S.; Nenov, Plamen T.
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：When crises potentially originate from coordination failures, does a deterioration in the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability? We address this question in a general global game of regime change with a unique equilibrium and illustrate the implications in a debt rollover application. We show that a reduction in the quality of information increases the likelihood of regime change, thus reducing stability, when the net payoff in the case of a...
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作者：Schottmuller, Christoph
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：The single-crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility. If single crossing is violated, global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account. This paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one-time violation of single crossing. The results show that local and non-local incentive constraints distort the solution in opposite directions. Therefor...
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作者：Borm, Peter; Ju, Yuan; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; University of York - UK; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities. Within this framework we propose a new value that extends the Shapley value to partition function form games, the so-called Rational Belief Shapley (RBS) value. We investigate the strategic foundation of the RBS value by constructing an implementation mechanism. This mechanism extends existing models of multilateral bargaining by allowing players a higher degree o...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that given a common prior, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common prior, the submitte...
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作者：Beker, Pablo F.; Hernando-Veciana, Angel
作者单位：University of Warwick; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We develop a model of bidding markets with financial constraints a la Che and Gale [15] in which two firms choose their budgets optimally and we extend it to a dynamic setting over an infinite horizon. We provide three main results for the case in which the exogenous cash-flow is not too large and the opportunity cost of budgets is positive but arbitrarily low. First, firms keep small budgets and markups are high most of the time. Second, the dispersion of markups and money left on the table a...
