Limits to rational learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levy, Yehuda John
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1-23
• 关键词: Rational learning; repeated games; Nash equilibrium

摘要

A long-standing open question raised in the seminal paper of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) is whether or not the play of a repeated game, in the rational learning model introduced there, must eventually resemble the play of exact equilibria, and not just the play of approximate equilibria as demonstrated there. This' paper shows that play may remain distant in fact, mutually singular from the play of any equilibrium of the repeated game. We further show that the same inaccessibility holds in Bayesian games, where the play of a Bayesian equilibrium may continue to remain distant from the play of any equilibrium of the true game. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.