A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji
• 署名单位: University of Sydney; University of Aizu
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.015
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1-27
• 关键词: Learning; stochastic stability; matching; marriage; college admissions

摘要

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.