On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McAdams, David
• 署名单位: Duke University; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 959-972
• 关键词: Dynamic bidding; Bidding cost; Preemptive bid; entry deterrence; Multi-round auction; Communication cost

摘要

Consider a second-price auction with costly bidding in which bidders with i.i.d. private values have multiple opportunities to bid. If bids are observable, the resulting dynamic-bidding game generates greater expected total welfare than if bids were sealed, for any given reserve price. Making early bids observable allows high-value bidders to signal their strength and deter others from entering the auction. Nonetheless, as long as the seller can commit to a reserve price, expected revenue is higher when bids are observable than when they are sealed. (c) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.