Multilateral matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 175-206
• 关键词: Matching; networks; joint ventures; STABILITY; competitive equilibrium; core

摘要

We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare theorems and, when agents' utilities are concave in venture participation, show that competitive equilibria exist, correspond to stable outcomes, and yield core outcomes. Competitive equilibria exist in our setting even when externalities are present. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.