Incentive compatible and stable trade mechanisms on networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 218-233
• 关键词: Trade mechanisms; networks; strategy-proofness; Bilateral trade stability; cycles; Demand reductions

摘要

We study a network of buyers and sellers where each seller owns an indivisible object and has no incentive to keep it, while each buyer has a downward sloping demand curve which is private information. Only the connected buyer-seller pairs can engage in trade. We search for trade mechanisms that are efficient, strategy-proof, bilateral trade stable and individually rational. In general, there does not exist a trade mechanism simultaneously satisfying these properties. The tension between strategy-proofness and bilateral trade stability is generated by the intersection between sets of competitors of a buyer at different sellers. Such intersections often allow the buyer to manipulate (via demand reductions) the prices paid in the network. The observed tension can be resolved if and only if the underlying network is cycle-free. In such a case, there is a unique trade mechanism which satisfies our four properties, a generalized Vickrey auction. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.