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作者：Aguiar, Victor H.; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); Brown University
摘要：Given any observed demand behavior-by means of a demand function, we quantify by how much it departs from rationality. The measure of the gap is the smallest Frobenius norm of the correcting matrix function that would yield a Slutsky matrix with its standard rationality properties (symmetry, singularity, and negative semidefiniteness). As a result, we are able to suggest a useful classification of departures from rationality, corresponding to three anomalies: inattentiveness to changes in purc...
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作者：Eraslan, Hulya; Merlo, Antonio
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：It is commonly believed that voting rules that are relatively more inclusive (e.g., unanimity or supermajority), are likely to yield relatively more equitable outcomes than simple-majority rule. We show that this is not necessarily the case in bargaining environments. We study a multilateral bargaining model a la Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where players are heterogeneous with respect to the potential surplus they bring to the bargaining table. We show that unanimity rule may generate equilibri...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Erickson, Philip; Jin, Jim
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of St Andrews
摘要：This paper provides a thorough exploration of the microeconomic foundations for the multi-variate linear demand function for differentiated products, which is widely used in industrial organization. The setting is the standard representative consumer with a quasi-linear utility function. A key finding is that strict concavity of the quadratic utility function is critical for the demand system to be well defined. Otherwise, the true demand function may be quite complex: Multi-valued, non-linear...
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作者：Celen, Bogachan; Schotter, Andrew; Blanco, Mariana
作者单位：New York University; University of Melbourne; New York University; New York University; Universidad del Rosario
摘要：The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question of what kindness is. In this paper, we offer a novel definition of kindness based on a notion of blame. This notion states that for player j to judge whether or not player i is kind to him, player j has to put himself in the position of player i, and ask if he would act in a manner that is worse than what he believes player i does....
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作者：Gauthier, Stephan; Laroque, Guy
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：A government designs anonymous income transfers between a continuum of citizens whose income valuation is privately known. When transfers are deterministic, the incentive constraints imply equal treatment independently of the government's taste for redistribution. We study whether random transfers may locally improve upon the egalitarian outcome. A suitable Taylor expansion offers an approximation of the utility function by a quasilinear function. The methodology developed by Myerson to deal w...
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作者：He, Wei; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
摘要：The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called (decomposable) coarser transition kernels. This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with finite actions and state-independent transitions, and stochastic games with mixtures of constant transition kernels as special cases. A remarkably simple proof is provided via establishing a new connection between ...
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作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the belief-free equilibria is evolutionarily stable, and that in generic games none of these equilibria is neutrally stable. Moreover, in a large family of games (which includes many public good games), the be...
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作者：Hwang, Ilwoo; Li, Fei
作者单位：University of Miami; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
摘要：We study the effect of the transparency of outside options in bilateral bargaining. A seller posts prices to screen a buyer over time, and the buyer may receive an outside option at a random time. We consider two information regimes: one in which the arrival of the outside option is public and one in which the arrival is private. A public arrival of the outside option works as a commitment device that forces the buyer to opt out immediately. This effect leads to a generically unique equilibriu...
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作者：Jerez, Belen
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We analyze a competitive (price-taking) search model where workers and firms make costly investments (e.g. in education and physical capital, respectively) before they enter the labor market. The environment features transferable utility and symmetric information. A key novelty with respect to existing work is that we allow for multidimensional heterogeneity on both sides of the market. The probabilities of finding and filling different jobs and the corresponding wages are determined endogenou...
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作者：Bhamra, Harjoat S.; Shim, Kyung Hwan
作者单位：Imperial College London; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：Stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility perform poorly relative to low idiosyncratic volatility stocks. We offer a novel explanation of this anomaly based on real options, which is consistent with earlier findings on idiosyncratic volatility (the positive contemporaneous relation between firm-level stock returns and idiosyncratic volatility). Our approach is based on introducing stochastic idiosyncratic cash flow risk into an equity valuation model of firms with growth options. Within our mo...
