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作者：Camacho, Carmen; Kamihigashi, Takashi; Saglam, Cagri
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Kobe University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：A policy change that involves a redistribution of income or wealth is typically controversial, affecting some people positively but others negatively. In this paper we extend the robust comparative statics result for large aggregative games established by Acemoglu and Jensen (2010) to possibly controversial policy changes. In particular, we show that both the smallest and the largest equilibrium values of an aggregate variable increase in response to a policy change to which individuals' react...
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作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Gonczarowski, Yannai A.
作者单位：Stanford University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences when this mechanism is used. This paper shows that no mechanism that implements a stable matching is obviously strategy-proof for any side of the market, a stronger in...
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作者：Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Prior to advising a decision maker, the expert needs to gather some relevant information. This often takes time, and therefore, even if the expert's learning process is unobservable, the timing of advice can be informative in itself. If, in addition, the expert can choose which experiments to perform, the timing of her advice may reveal not only the amount but also the type of information at her disposal. This paper studies a dynamic information transmission problem where a biased expert acqui...
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作者：Carvajal, Andres; Rostek, Marzena; Sublet, Guillaume
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Universite de Montreal; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Could a firm benefit from not disclosing all of its private information before its stock is traded in public financial markets? So long as the investors' marginal utility function is convex and the investors differ only in their risk-sharing needs, three substantive results hold: (1) a full disclosure policy minimizes the value of the firm; (2) lifting a mandate of full disclosure does not imply that firms will necessarily choose to withhold information maximally; and (3) with many firms that ...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We study the testable implications of normal demand in a two-goods setting. For a finite dataset on prices and quantities, we present the revealed preference conditions for normality of one or both goods. Our characterization provides an intuitive extension of the well-known Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, and is easy to use in practice. We illustrate the empirical relevance of our theoretical results through an application to an experimental dataset. We also briefly discuss extensions of o...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Manuelli, Lucas; Straub, Ludwig
作者单位：Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper proposes a model of signal distortion in a two-player game with imperfect public monitoring. We construct a tractable theoretical framework where each player has the opportunity to distort the true public signal and each player is uncertain about the distortion technologies available to the other player. We show that when players evaluate strategies according to their worst-case guarantees i.e., are ambiguity averse over certain distributions in the environment perceived continuatio...
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作者：Priazhkina, Sofia; Page, Frank H.
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This paper presents a network formation game of buyers and sellers with market sharing. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers exchange access to buyers for negotiated payments to overcome search frictions. With homogeneous preferences, sharing increases market trade volume. Surprisingly, buyers benefit from sharing when sellers have stronger bargaining positions. With heterogeneous preferences, market sharing may decrease market trade volume. Also, when sellers have more bargain...
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作者：Zhang, Shengxing
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：To understand the illiquidity of the over-the-counter market when dealers and traders are in long-term relationships, I develop a framework to study the endogenous liquidity distortions resulting from the profit maximizing, screening behavior of dealers. The dealer offers the trading mechanism contingent on the aggregate history of his customers summarized by the asset allocation. The equilibrium distortion is type dependent: trade with small surplus breaks down; trade with intermediate surplu...
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作者：Alva, Samson
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：For combinatorial choice problems, I show that the Irrelevance of Rejected Items condition is equivalent to the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), and is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a complete, reflexive and antisymmetric rationalization of a combinatorial choice function. I also show the equivalence of WARP to path independence and to other classical choice conditions when the choice domain is combinatorial. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Goldstein, Itay; Leitner, Yaron
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：We study an optimal disclosure policy of a regulator that has information about banks (e.g., from conducting stress tests). In our model, disclosure can destroy risk-sharing opportunities for banks (the Hirshleifer effect). Yet, in some cases, some level of disclosure is necessary for risk sharing to occur. We provide conditions under which optimal disclosure takes a simple form (e.g., full disclosure, no disclosure, or a cutoff rule). We also show that, in some cases, optimal disclosure takes...
