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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Wu, Qinggong
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Aarhus University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We model competition between two teams (that may differ in size) as an all-pay contest with incomplete information where team members exert effort to increase the performance of their own team. The team with the higher performance wins, and its members enjoy the prize as a public good. The value of the prize is identical to members of the same team but is unknown to those of the other team. We focus on the case in which a team's performance is the sum of its individual members' performances an...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Dufwenberg, Martin A.
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Arizona
摘要：We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices)...
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作者：Fanning, Jack
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：I show how uncertainty about agents' future costs of delay can lead to substantial bargaining delays when agents have reputational concerns. Reputational concerns arise because with positive probability agents are behavioral types, committed to demanding a fixed share of the surplus. In equilibrium, rational agents may demand almost the entire surplus and then wait, with the deadlock only broken by the arrival of news about future costs, even as the probability of behavioral types vanishes. Al...
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作者：Geanakoplos, John; Walsh, Kieran James
作者单位：Yale University; The Santa Fe Institute; University of Virginia
摘要：We offer new sufficient conditions ensuring demand is downward sloping local to equilibrium. It follows that equilibrium is unique and stable in the sense that rising supply implies falling prices. In our setting, there are two goods, which we interpret as consumption in different time periods, and many impatience types. Agents have the same Bernoulli utility function, but the types differ arbitrarily in time preference. Our main result is that if endowments are identical and utility displays ...
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作者：Hashimoto, Tadashi
作者单位：Yeshiva University
摘要：This paper studies allocation problems with and without monetary transfers, such as combinatorial auctions, school choice, and course allocation. Interdependent values and multidimensional signals are allowed. Despite known negative results, a mechanism exists that is feasible, ex post individually rational, ex post incentive compatible, and asymptotically both efficient and envy-free. This mechanism is a special case of the generalized random priority mechanism (GRP), which always satisfies t...
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作者：Sultanum, Bruno
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：This paper studies the interaction between financial fragility and over-the-counter (OTC) markets. I model the financial sector as a large number of investors divided into different groups, which I interpret as financial institutions, and a large number of dealers. Financial institutions and dealers trade assets in an OTC market a la Duffie et al. (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). Investors receive privately observed preference shocks, and financial institutions use the balanced team mech...
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作者：Espino, Emilio; Kozlowski, Julian; Sanchez, Juan M.
作者单位：Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; New York University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：Private information may limit insurance possibilities when two agents get together to pool idiosyncratic risk. However, if there is capital accumulation, bilateral insurance possibilities may improve because misreporting distorts investment. We show that if one of the Pareto weights is sufficiently large, that agent does not have incentives to misreport. This implies that, under some conditions, the full information allocation is incentive compatible when agents have equal Pareto weights. In t...
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作者：Mackowiak, Bartosz; Matejka, Filip; Wiederholt, Mirko
作者单位：European Central Bank; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：This paper presents analytical results for dynamic rational inattention problems as in Sims (2003). The agent tracks an optimal action that follows a Gaussian process. The agent chooses the properties of the signals that he receives, so as to minimize the mean squared difference between his action and the optimal action, subject to a constraint on information flow. We prove that the optimal signal is a one-dimensional signal about the elements of the state vector, which typically has non-zero ...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper incorporates costly information into a model of observational learning. Individuals would like to avoid the cost of buying information and free-ride on the public history. The paper characterizes when learning is nevertheless complete. Necessary and sufficient conditions for complete learning follow from an elementary principle: a player purchases information only if it can influence her action. With a coarse action space, learning is complete if and only if for every cost c > 0, a ...
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作者：Ghirardato, Paolo; Siniscalchi, Marciano
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes risk sharing in economies with no aggregate uncertainty when agents have non convex preferences. In particular, agents need not be globally risk-averse, or uncertainty-averse in the sense of Schmeidler (1989). We identify a behavioral condition under which betting is inefficient (i.e., every Pareto-efficient allocation provides full insurance, and conversely) if and only if agents' supporting probabilities (defined as in Rigotti et al., 2008) have a non-empty intersection. ...
