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作者：Baranov, Oleg
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：Known dynamic implementations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in general private-value auction settings utilize non-linear (not additively-separable over goods) and non-anonymous (bidder-specific) prices. The need for non-linear and non-anonymous prices - a complication that is often difficult to implement in practice - arises from limiting attention to elicitation processes based on demand queries (i.e., asking bidders to report their demands at posted prices). In this paper, we relax ...
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作者：Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet mechanisms implement efficient social choice by compensating each agent for the externalities that his report imposes on all other agents. Instead of aggregate compensations, which may lead to profitable coalitional deviations, this paper provides an alternative mechanism, in which each pair of agents directly compensate each other for the pairwise externalities they impose. Under the assumption of independent private values, any agent is ...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.; Sachdeva, Ashish
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study in the laboratory three-, four- and six-player, dominance solvable games of complete information. We consider sequential and simultaneous versions of games that have the same, unique Nash equilibrium, and we use mousetracking to understand the decision making process of subjects. We find more equilibrium choices in the sequential version than in the simultaneous version of the game and we highlight the importance of attentional measures. Indeed, depending on the treatment, equilibrium...
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作者：Kendall, Chad
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：I model a financial market in which traders acquire private information through time-consuming research. A time cost of information arises due to competition - through the expected adverse price movements due to others' trades - causing traders to rush to trade on weak information. This cost monotonically increases with asset value uncertainty, so that, exactly opposite to the result under the standard modeling assumption of a monetary cost of information, traders acquire the least information...
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作者：Khan, Urmee; Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Respect for first order distributional overtaking guarantees that social welfare functions for intergenerational problems treat present and future people equally and respect the Pareto criterion, modulo null sets. For weakly ergodic optimization problems, this class of social welfare functions yields solutions that respect welfare concerns, sharply contrasting with extant patient criteria. For problems in which the evolution of future paths hinges on early events and decisions, the curvature o...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto
作者单位：Stanford University; Keio University; Kyushu University
摘要：We consider two-sided matching problems where agents on one side of the market (hospitals) are required to satisfy certain distributional constraints. We show that when the preferences and constraints of the hospitals can be represented by an M-(sic)-concave function, (i) the generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism is strategyproof for doctors, (ii) it produces the doctor-optimal stable matching, and (iii) its time complexity is proportional to the square of the number of possible contr...
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作者：Papageorgiou, Theodore
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：This paper considers the equilibrium interaction between within firm and across firm reallocation in the presence of labor market frictions. While a sizable literature has investigated frictional labor markets, it has ignored within firm mobility. Nonetheless, every year a sizable fraction of workers switch occupations without changing firms. Employees in large firms can sample from a larger selection and across firm mobility is replaced by within firm mobility. Bringing together within and ac...
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作者：Araujo, Luis; Hu, Tai-Wei
作者单位：Michigan State University; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Bristol
摘要：We characterize optimal credit market interventions with respect to two fundamental frictions limited commitment and limited monitoring. We consider two classes of interventions: an inflationary policy which uses inflation tax to forgive private debt, and a deflationary policy which uses credit tax to increase the real rate of return on money. We show that both money and debt are essential and that intervention is generically optimal. The nature of the optimal intervention depends on the funda...
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作者：Tomura, Hajime
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：This paper presents a three-period model to analyze why banks need bank reserves despite the presence of other liquid assets, such as Treasury securities. The model shows that if a pair of banks settle bank transfers between them without the central bank, a hold-up problem occurs when they bargain over the terms of settlement. This result stems from the confidentiality of bank-transfer requests, which makes it necessary for a depositor to retain an outside option to withdraw cash to enforce a ...
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作者：Tsai, Jerry; Wachter, Jessica A.
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We solve for asset prices in a general affine representative-agent economy with isoelastic recursive utility and rare events. Our novel solution method is exact in two special cases: no preference for early resolution of uncertainty and elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to one. Our results clarify model properties governed by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, by risk aversion, and by the preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Finally, we show in a general sett...
