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作者：Escobar, Juan F.; Llanes, Gaston
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We study cooperation dynamics in repeated games with Markovian private information. After any history, signaling reveals information that helps players coordinate their future actions, but also makes the problem of coordinating current actions harder. In equilibrium, players may play aggressive or uncooperative actions that signal private information and partners tolerate a certain number of such actions. We discuss several applications of our results: We explain the cycles of cooperation and ...
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Chateauneuf, Alain; Faro, Jose Heleno
作者单位：Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); IPAG Business School; Insper
摘要：It is well known that when an arbitrage-free financial market is incomplete or has tradable financial assets with frictions there must be multiple risk-neutral probability measures. The main motivation for the present study is to elucidate what type of market structure usually emerges from pricing rules. First, we obtain that finitely generated pricing rules, characterized by polytopes of probabilities, capture the class of all finite arbitrage-free financial markets that are potentially incom...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Li, Jiangtao
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Singapore Management University
摘要：An important question in mechanism design is whether there is any theoretical foundation for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This paper studies the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms in general social choice environments with quasi-linear preferences and private values. We propose a condition called the uniform shortest-path tree that, under regularity, ensures the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This exposes the underlying logic of the existe...
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作者：Carrasco, Vinicius; Luz, Vitor Farinha; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias; Monteiro, Paulo; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; University of British Columbia; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Cologne
摘要：We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller who is partially informed about the distribution of buyer's valuations, only knowing its first N moments. The seller chooses the mechanism generating the best revenue guarantee based on the information available, that is, the optimal mechanism is chosen according to maxmin expected revenue. We show that the transfer function in the optimal mechanism is given by non-negative monotonic hull of a polynomial of degree N. This enables us to tran...
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作者：Sorokin, Constantine; Zakharov, Alexei
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); New Economic School
摘要：We study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth, strictly increasing utility functions that translate vote shares into payoffs. We find that if a strict Nash equilibrium exists in a model with an infinite number of voters, then nearby equilibria should exist for similar large, but finite, electorates. If the votes are independent random events, then equilibria will not depend on the utility functions of the candidates. Our results have implications for exi...
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作者：Honryo, Takakazu
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper addresses the issue of risky shifts by a multi-sender signaling game. Senders compete in making proposals to be adopted by a group, hence they try to signal that they have the ability to correctly observe the state. This paper shows that senders tend to avoid making a moderate proposal, because a moderate proposal signals incompetence. When facing a moderate and a risky proposal, the group tends to adopt the risky one, and we have risky shifts as a result. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available information. An optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference relation, net of a cognitive cost of attention. The main result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions by an agent that are necessary and sufficient for her behavi...
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作者：Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of Osaka
摘要：We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one player (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other player (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned. As a key departure from the existing literature, we assume that the principal may be privately informed about the project quality. In contrast to the literature, the belief in our model generally follows a non-monotonic ...
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作者：Dutta, Rohan; Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：McGill University; European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Palermo
摘要：We study common agency problems in which two principals (groups) make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent's action. Our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments. For our basic model we obtain a unique equilibrium, which typically involves randomization by both principals. Greater similarity between principals leads to more aggressive competition. The principals weakly prefer punishment to rewards, sometimes strictly...
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作者：Felli, Leonardo; Harris, Christopher
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper investigates the market provision of firm-specific training, and identifies the inefficiencies associated with it. Within a general stochastic learning-by-doing model, there is a potential inefficiency in the market provision of firm-specific training. In order to determine whether this inefficiency is in fact present, we analyze two special cases of the model: the accelerated productivity-enhancement model and the accelerated learning model. In both models, the inefficiency is inde...
