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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We provide a simple upper bound on the Nash equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bound admits a tractable recursive characterization and can thus be applied off-the-shelf' to any repeated game. The bound is not tight in general, but it is tight if the stage game is concave or if a certain form of observable mixed actions is allowed. We illustrate our results with applications to the repeated prisoners' dilemma and to canonic...
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作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Camara, Odilon
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southern California
摘要：We consider a persuasion model in which a sender influences the actions of a receiver by selecting an experiment (public signal) from a set of feasible experiments. We ask: does the sender benefit from becoming an expert-observing a private signal prior to her selection? We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to never gain by becoming informed. Our key condition (sequential redundancy) shows that the informativeness of public experiments can substitute for the sender's exp...
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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：Two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good. When the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions, we identify the set of pricing strategies that are consistent with an equilibrium in which one of the firms monopolizes the market. The set includes marginal cost (MC) pricing as well as bipartition pricing, which o...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Lund University
摘要：In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a few other agents in the past. In this paper we analyze a broad class of such social learning processes, and study under what circumstances the initial behavior of the population has a lasting effect. Our results show that this question strongly depends on the expected number of actions observed by new agents. Specifically, we show that if the expected number of observed actions is: (1) less than o...
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作者：Duffle, Darrell; Qiao, Lei; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; National University of Singapore
摘要：We develop a general and unified model in which a continuum of agents conduct directed random searches for counterparties. Our results provide the first probabilistic foundation for static and dynamic models of directed search (including the matching-function approach) that are common in search-based models of financial markets, monetary theory, and labor economics. The agents' types are shown to be independent discrete-time Markov processes that incorporate the effects of random mutation, ran...
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作者：Kurmann, Andre; Rabinovich, Stanislav
作者单位：Drexel University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
摘要：We study the efficiency implications of bargaining in frictional capital markets in which firms match bilaterally with dealers in order to buy or sell capital. We show how two of the distinguishing characteristics of capital ownership and the intertemporal nature of investment give rise to a dynamic inefficiency. Firms that anticipate buying capital in the future overinvest because this increases their outside option of no trade in negotiations with dealers in the future, thereby lowering the ...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the individually-rationalcore (IR-core) whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowments. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the IR-core is n...
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作者：Latzer, Helene
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University Saint-Louis - Bruxelles
摘要：This paper introduces multi-quality firms within a Schumpeterian framework. Featuring non-homothetic preferences and income disparities in an otherwise standard quality-ladder model, it shows that the resulting differences in the willingness to pay for quality among consumers generate both positive investments in R&D by industry leaders and positive market shares for more than one quality, hence allowing for the emergence of multi-product firms within a vertical innovation framework. This posi...
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作者：Dybvig, Philip; Liu, Fang
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We extend Cass and Stiglitz's analysis of preference-based mutual fund separation. We provide a complete characterization of the general K-fund separation. We show that some instances of separation with many funds can be constructed by adding inverse marginal utility functions having separation with one or a few funds. We also show that there is money separation (in which we can choose the riskless asset as one of the funds) if and only if there is a fund (which may or may not be the riskless ...
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作者：Casajus, Andre
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
摘要：We pinpoint the position of the (symmetric) Shapley value within the class of positively weighted Shapley value to their treatment of symmetric versus mutually dependent players. While symmetric players are equally productive, mutually dependent players are only jointly (hence, equally) productive. In particular, we provide a characterization of the whole class of positively weighted Shapley values that uses two standard properties, efficiency and the null player out property, and a new proper...
