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作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper proposes a simple unified framework of choice under changing awareness, addressing both outcome awareness and (nature) state awareness, and both how fine and how exhaustive the awareness is. Six axioms characterize an (essentially unique) expected-utility rationalization of preferences, in which utilities and probabilities are revised according to three revision rules when awareness changes: (R1) utilities of unaffected outcomes are transformed affinely; (R2) probabilities of unaffe...
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作者：Koray, Semih; Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：Implementation of socially desirable alternatives can be thought of as a way to design power distribution in a society such that the equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen at each preference profile. In this paper, we introduce a new institutional framework for implementation, which takes power distribution in a society as its point of departure. We use the notion of a rights structure, introduced by Sertel (2001), to formalize the power distribution in a society. We formul...
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作者：Mihm, Maximilian; Ozbek, Kemal
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of St Andrews
摘要：We model a decision maker who can exert costly effort to regulate herself, thereby reducing internal conflicts between her normative objectives and mood-driven choices. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the model, and show how costs of self-regulation can be elicited and compared across individuals. In a consumption-saving problem we show that self-regulation can generate unintended income effects, which have important implications for public policies on saving behavior. We also prov...
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作者：Miliner, Antony; Heal, Geoffrey
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Recent work on collective intertemporal choice suggests that non-dictatorial social preferences are generically time inconsistent. We argue that this claim conflates time consistency with two distinct properties of preferences: stationarity and time invariance. While time invariance and stationarity together imply time consistency, the converse does not hold. Although non-dictatorial social preferences cannot be stationary, they may be time consistent if time invariance is abandoned. If indivi...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Condorelli, Daniele; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Essex; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study private value auctions in which bidders may collude without using side-payments. In our model, bidders coordinate their actions to achieve an outcome that interim-Pareto dominates the noncooperative outcome. We characterize auctions that are collusion-proof in the sense that no such coordination opportunities exist, and show that the efficient and revenue maximizing auctions are not collusion-proof unless all bidders exhibit a concave distribution of valuations. We then solve for reve...
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作者：Kalai, Ehud; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The paper presents a model of large strategic dynamic interactions in an environment with uncertain fundamentals. The interaction is among a large finite group of interdependent players, diversified in their preferences and information. We study an imagined-continuum equilibrium, a behavioral hybrid of games with a continuum of players and finite games. This equilibrium enables simple Bayesian reasoning and admits natural Markov-perfect equilibria. In addition, we establish bounds on the proba...
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作者：d'Albis, Hippolyte; Greulich, Angela; Ponthiere, Gregory
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Universite Gustave-Eiffel; Universite Paris-Est-Creteil-Val-de-Marne (UPEC); Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：During the last century, fertility has exhibited, in industrialized economies, two distinct trends: the cohort total fertility rate follows a decreasing pattern, while the cohort average age at motherhood exhibits a U-shaped pattern. This paper proposes a Unified Growth Theory aimed at rationalizing those two demographic stylized facts. We develop a three-period OLG model with two periods of fertility, and show how a traditional economy, where individuals do not invest in education, and where ...
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作者：Gobbi, Paula E.
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：This paper proposes a semi-cooperative marital decision process to explain parental underinvestment in childcare. First, parents collectively choose the amount of labor to supply and, in a second step, they each choose the amount of childcare as the outcome of a Cournot game. Non-cooperative behavior stems from the lack of a credible commitment between spouses regarding the amount of childcare they each supply. The theoretical model is able to reproduce the fact that parental time with childre...
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作者：Tomoeda, Kentaro
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：In matching problems with minimum and maximum type-specific quotas, there may not exist a stable (i.e., fair and non-wasteful) assignment (Ehlers et al., 2014). This paper investigates the structure of schools' priority rankings which guarantees stability. First, we show that there always exists a fair and non-wasteful assignment if for each type of students, schools have common priority rankings over a certain number of bottom students. Next, we show that the pairwise version of this conditio...
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作者：Dogan, Battal; Dogan, Serhat; Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：We introduce and analyze an efficiency criterion for probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available. This efficiency criterion is based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if it is ex-ante efficient for a strictly larger set of utility profiles consistent with the ordinal preferences. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment...
