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作者：Norman, Thomas W. L.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：It is shown that, in infinitely-repeated games between two arbitrarily patient players, strategy profiles with inefficient pure stage-Nash continuations are not strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). By contrast, a set of strategy profiles similar to the Prisoners' Dilemma's perfect tit-for-tat is uniformly robust to perfect entrants (Swinkels, 1992), and hence contains a strategically stable set. Moreover, this set satisfies iterated dominance and a version of forward induction, w...
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作者：Bethune, Zachary; Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Bristol; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We characterize the equilibrium set of a two-good, pure-credit economy with limited commitment, under both pairwise and centralized meetings. We show that the set of equilibria derived under not-too-tight solvency constraints (Alvarez and Jermann, 2000) commonly used in the literature is of measure zero in the whole set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. There exist a continuum of stationary equilibria, a continuum of endogenous credit cycles of any periodicity, and a continuum of sunspot equilib...
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作者：Liu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Ruqu; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; National University of Singapore; Zhejiang University; Queens University - Canada; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：In this paper, we analyze the role of negative prizes in contest design with a fixed budget, risk-neutral contestants, and independent private abilities. The effort-maximizing prize allocation rule features a threshold. When the highest effort is above the threshold, all contestants with lower efforts receive negative prizes. These negative prizes are used to augment the prize to the contestant with the highest effort, which better incentivizes contestants with higher abilities. When no contes...
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作者：Foss, Sergey; Shneer, Vsevolod; Thomas, Jonathan P.; Worrall, Tim
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Heriot Watt University; Heriot Watt University; Russian Academy of Sciences; Sobolev Institute of Mathematics; Novosibirsk State University; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We introduce and analyze a new class of monotone stochastic recursions in a regenerative environment which is essentially broader than that of Markov chains. We prove stability theorems and apply our results to three canonical models in recursive economics, generalizing some known stability results to the cases when driving sequences are not independent and identically distributed. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Drozd, Lukasz A.; Serrano-Padial, Ricardo
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Drexel University
摘要：We study the negative feedback loop between the aggregate default rate and the efficacy of enforcement in a model of debt-financed entrepreneurial activity. The novel feature of our model is that enforcement capacity is accumulated ex ante and thus subject to depletion ex post. We characterize the effect of shocks that deplete enforcement resources on the aggregate default rate and credit supply. In the model default decisions by entrepreneurs are strategic complements, leading to multiple equ...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kuebler, Dorothea; Kurino, Morimitsu
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Technical University of Berlin; Keio University
摘要：We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of centralized college admissions (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and decentralized college admissions (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are...
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作者：Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：I propose a centralized clearinghouse for college admissions where students can commit to enroll, as in early-decision programs. Furthermore, students can specify financial aid in their preferences, and they can be matched with multiple colleges simultaneously. This clearinghouse keeps the desirable properties of decentralized college admissions, like commitment and yield management, while getting rid of the undesirable aspects, such as unfairness and unraveling. To study centralized college a...
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作者：Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.; Hickman, Brent R.
摘要：We develop a model of college assignment as a large contest wherein students with heterogeneous learning-costs compete for seats at vertically differentiated colleges through the acquisition of productive human capital. We use a continuum model to approximate the outcomes of a game with large, but finite, sets of colleges and students. The continuum approximation lends tractability to a rich model for studying investment incentives in rank-order competitions. By incorporating two common famili...
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作者：Dai, Liang
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：This paper investigates how a profit-maximizing asset originator can coordinate the information acquisition of investors with different expertise by means of asset bundling. Bundling is beneficial to the originator when it discourages investors from analyzing idiosyncratic risks and focuses their attention on aggregate risks. But it is optimal to sell aggregate risks separately in order to exploit investors' heterogeneous expertise in learning about them and thus lower the risk premium. This a...
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作者：Bengui, Julien; Toan Phan
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We develop a simple model of defaultable debt and rational bubbles in the price of an asset, which can be pledged as collateral in a competitive credit pool. When the asset pledgeability is low, the down payment is high, and bubble investment is unleveraged, as in a standard rational bubble model. When the pledgeability is high, the down payment is low, making it easier for leveraged borrowers to invest in the bubbly asset. As loans are packaged together into a competitive pool, the pricing of...
