Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power ?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Albrecht, James; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Peking University; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105121
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Multiple applications; directed search; competing mechanisms; EFFICIENCY; market power

摘要

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by the firm's candidate. When the contract space includes application fees, there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of which only one is efficient, and it has a posted wage equal to match output. In the inefficient equilibria, the wage is below match output, and the value of a worker's application depends on whether he or she receives another offer. This allows individual firms to free ride on one another and gives firms market power. When we endogenize the number of applications and allow for general mechanisms, only the efficient equilibrium survives. By allowing for general mechanisms, we are able to examine the sources of inefficiency in the multiple applications literature. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.