Repeated coordination with private learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Basu, Pathikrit; Chatterjee, Kalyan; Hoshino, Tetsuya; Tamuz, Omer
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105106
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: coordination; repeated games; Private learning; Learning from actions; Common learning

摘要

We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.