Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Takahashi, Satoru; Tercieux, Olivier
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Incomplete information; Robustness; higher-order beliefs; refinements; Subgame-perfect implementation

摘要

We analyze the robustness of equilibria in sequential games when there is almost common certainty of payoffs. We show that a generic extensive-form game may have no robust equilibrium behavior, but has at least one robust equilibrium outcome, which is induced by a proper equilibrium in its normal-form representation. Therefore, backward induction leads to a unique robust outcome in a generic perfect-information game. We also discuss close relation between robustness to incomplete information and strategic stability. Finally, we present the implications of our results for the robustness of subgame-perfect implementation. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.