Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chander, Parkash; Wooders, Myrna
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105017
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Extensive game; Subgame perfection; Coalitional game; centipede game; Bargaining game; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium

摘要

We propose a new solution concept for games in extensive form that incorporates both cooperation and subgame perfection. From its definition and properties, the new solution concept, named the subgame-perfect core, is a refinement of the core of an extensive game in the same sense as the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibria. To further characterize the subgame-perfect core, we show that each subgame-perfect core payoff vector can be implemented as a non-cooperative solution, as it is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vector of an extensive form game that is closely related to the original game. We also motivate and introduce a related concept of subgame-perfect strong Nash equilibrium of an extensive game that is coalition proof. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.