The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, Dirk; Castro, Francisco; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105055
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Sequential screening; Ex post participation constraints; Static contract; Sequential contract

摘要

We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex post participation constraints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions that determine when the optimal selling mechanism is either static or sequential. In the static contract, the buyers are not screened with respect to their interim type and the object is sold at a posted price. In the sequential contract, the buyers are screened with respect to their interim type and a menu of quantities is offered. We completely characterize the optimal sequential contract with binary interim types and a continuum of ex post values. Importantly, the optimal sequential contract randomizes the allocation of the low-type buyer and awards a deterministic allocation to the high type buyer. Finally, we provide additional results for the case of multiple interim types. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.