When (not) to publicize inspection results

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Solan, Eilon; Zhao, Chang
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; University of International Business & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105667
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Dynamic inspection; imperfect monitoring; Optimal information revelation

摘要

We consider a dynamic inspection problem between a principal and several agents. The principal ob-serves the full inspection history, whereas each agent only observes inspections imposed on himself. When inspection resources are limited, the inspection intensities for agents are negatively correlated, and hence each agent cares not only about his own inspection history, but also about the inspection histories of the other agents. In such cases, should the principal publicly reveal past inspection history, or should she con-ceal this information? We show that the principal benefits from concealing inspection history. Nevertheless, this benefit becomes less significant as the number of agents increases, and disappears in the limit case with a continuum of agents. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.