2023

最新文章

• Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms AI翻译
  作者：Zeng, Yishu
  作者单位：York University - Canada
  摘要：We consider a setting where one sender can communicate with several privately informed receivers through a persuasion mechanism before the receivers play a game. We show that for any potentially randomized persuasion mechanism, under certain conditions, there is an effectively equivalent deterministic persuasion mechanism, and these two mechanisms have the same set of equilibria. We exhibit the usefulness of our result in an information disclosure application, where our technique helps to deri...
• The paradox of safe asset creation AI翻译
  作者：Segura, Anatoli; Villacorta, Alonso
  作者单位：European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
  摘要：Safe asset demand increases loan risk. This arises in a competitive model in which securitization vehicles create safe assets by pooling loan payoffs purchased from loan originators. Equity investors allocate their wealth between originators, who need skin-in-the-game due to moral hazard, and vehicles, who need loss-absorption capacity against aggregate risk. An increase in demand for safety fosters safe asset creation through a securitization boom: originators sell more of their loan payoffs ...
• Money-metrics in local welfare analysis: Pareto improvements and equity considerations AI翻译
  作者：Schlee, Edward E.; Khan, M. Ali
  作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Johns Hopkins University
  摘要：We identify local Pareto improvements from a valuation equilibrium, and extend the results of Hirshleifer, Arrow-Lind, Milleron, and Radner on the evaluation of small projects to behavioral or nonstandard choice models. We use the sign of directional derivative of the sum of McKenzie-Samuelson money metrics to evaluate small projects, but, rather than assume its differentiability, furnish preference conditions that guarantee it. Our methods yield, as an unintended consequence, (i) a refutation...
• A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff AI翻译
  作者：Dargaj, Jakub; Simonsen, Jakob Grue
  作者单位：University of Copenhagen
  摘要：It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or for classes of games satisfying certain conditions not known to be both necessary and sufficient.We derive a complete characterization in the form of simple necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a computable strategy without a computable be...
• The A/B testing problem with Gaussian priors AI翻译
  作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Mao, David; Olea, Jose Luis Montiel; Velez, Amilcar
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania; Cornell University; Northwestern University
  摘要：A risk-neutral firm can perform a randomized experiment (A/B test) to learn about the effects of im-plementing an idea of unknown quality. The firm's goal is to decide the experiment's sample size and whether or not the idea should be implemented after observing the experiment's outcome. We show that when the distribution for idea quality is Gaussian and there are linear costs of experimentation, there are exact formulae for the firm's optimal implementation decisions, the value of obtaining m...
• Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge AI翻译
  作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei
  作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Singapore Management University; University of International Business & Economics
  摘要：The literature on robust mechanism design assumes players' knowledge about a fixed payoff environment and investigates global robustness of optimal mechanisms to large changes in the information structure. Ac-knowledging global robustness as a demanding requirement, we propose continuous implementation as a notion of local robustness. Keeping the assumption of payoff knowledge, we say that an SCF is continu-ously implementable if there exists a mechanism which yields the outcome close to the d...
• The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning AI翻译
  作者：Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun; Katsenos, Georgios; Ozdenoren, Emre
  作者单位：Leibniz University Hannover; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; heSam Universite; ESCP Business School
  摘要：We offer a model of scientific progress in which uncertainty resolves over time. We show that rivalry leads to less experimentation, extending results for preemption games to experimentation with uncertain outcomes. We compare experimentation duration and welfare when experimental outcomes are publicly versus privately observable. We show that public learning can generate more experimentation and higher welfare when uncertainty about the feasibility of a breakthrough is large; breakthroughs ar...
• Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains AI翻译
  作者：Roy, Souvik; Sadhukhan, Soumyarup
  作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur
  摘要：We consider the problem of choosing a committee from a set of available candidates through a random-ized social choice function when there are restrictions on the committee to be formed and agents have separable preferences over the committees. We show that when the set of feasible committees is non -vacuously restricted, that is, cannot be seen as the set of all committees with a subset of members, a random social choice function is onto and strategy-proof if and only if it is random dictator...
• Moral hazard and subjective evaluation AI翻译
  作者：Ishiguro, Shingo; Yasuda, Yosuke
  作者单位：University of Osaka
  摘要：This study investigates optimal contracts to solve the moral hazard problem with subjective evaluation in a static environment with multiple agents wherein the principal observes agents' performances privately. Despite the limitations of feasible contracts that the principal can credibly offer, we show the irrelevance theorem that even under subjective evaluation, the principal can be as well off as if agents' performances are objective and verifiable, provided there are at least two risk-neut...
• The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring AI翻译
  作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
  作者单位：University of Surrey
  摘要：We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring under the assumption that the monitoring structure is endogenously chosen by the players in each period. We allow the players to choose from all possible monitoring structures. If the players disagree on the monitoring structure they would like, the realized monitoring structure is determined by a function that aggregates their choices. When one player can dictate the monitoring structure, then the repetition of the stage Nash is...