The paradox of safe asset creation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Segura, Anatoli; Villacorta, Alonso
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105640
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Securitization; Originate -to -distribute; Safety demand; diversification; moral hazard

摘要

Safe asset demand increases loan risk. This arises in a competitive model in which securitization vehicles create safe assets by pooling loan payoffs purchased from loan originators. Equity investors allocate their wealth between originators, who need skin-in-the-game due to moral hazard, and vehicles, who need loss-absorption capacity against aggregate risk. An increase in demand for safety fosters safe asset creation through a securitization boom: originators sell more of their loan payoffs to vehicles, equity is reallocated from originators to vehicles, and the two effects contribute to an increase in loan risk. The model is consistent with a broad set of facts in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.