-
作者：Bilodeau, M; Slivinski, A
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Who will do a job that nobody wants but that someone has to do? The search for a volunteer is modelled as a war of attrition in which everyone is tempted to just wait for someone else to do it. We show that the volunteer will be, ceteris paribus, the individual for whom the benefit/cost ratio of performing the public service is largest, the one most impatient to consume it, or the one who stands to benefit from it the longest.
-
作者：Doherty, NA; Thistle, PD
作者单位：Western Michigan University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Models of adverse selection assume that risk type is known to the consumer but not to the insurer. Many analyses suggest that information has zero social value and negative prior value. Why then would consumers become informed? What is the incentive to gather information and why does adverse selection arise? We show that the private value of information is non-negative only if insurers cannot observe consumers' information status, or if consumers can conceal their informational status. We exam...
-
作者：Carraro, C; Galeotti, M; Gallo, M
作者单位：Fondazione Mattei; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Bergamo
摘要：The employment 'double dividend hypothesis' suggests that an appropriately designed fiscal reform, in which emission charges are used to subsidize employers' social security contributions, may realize (at least) two relevant policy goals: a better quality of the environment and, at the same time, an increase in employment levels. This paper uses a newly developed econometric general equilibrium model for the European Union as well as for each member country and presents simulation results up t...
-
作者：Parsons, DO
摘要：This paper derives the optimal benefit structure of an earnings insurance program when a characteristic or 'tag' imperfectly identifies those unable to work. With a two-sided classification error, the optimal program is a dual work incentive system, with a work/non-work consumption differential maintained for the tagged and untagged just sufficient to induce the able in each group to work, and with more generous payments to tagged than to untagged individuals of the same work status. It includ...
-
作者：Cairns, RD; ListonHeyes, C
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：A simple model of the taxi industry suggests that deregulation of fares and entry may not be optimal. The conditions of competition do not hold in the industry, even approximately. A model of search, where drivers and riders search for each other, is presented for the cruising-taxi market. This indicates that equilibrium of a deregulated industry does not exist. Price regulation is essential, and entry regulation may be useful. In addition, viewing the medallion as a bond for appropriate perfo...
-
作者：Leach, J
摘要：It is assumed that there are two regions, that production requires both skilled and unskilled labour, and that one region is innately more productive than the other. Workers, who differ in their migration or training costs? make individually rational decisions. In equilibrium the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers is always higher in the more productive region. Average incomes differ between regions because regional differences in wage rates are reinforced by regional differences in...
-
作者：Palfrey, TR; Prisbrey, JE
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We report an experiment using a design that permits the direct measurement of individual decision rules in voluntary contribution games, We estimate the distribution of altruism in our subjects and find that observed 'overcontribution' is attributable to a combination of random variation in behavior and a few altruistic players. We also employ Andreoni's partners/strangers design to measure reputation effects. The only difference observed is that the strangers treatment produces slightly more ...
-
作者：Fleurbaey, M
摘要：The solutions proposed in the literature on fair allocations are sensitive to the preference profiles of the agents. As a consequence, each of them displays a specific distribution pattern which may be interpreted as rewarding certain kinds of preferences at the expense of others. In the basic models with private goods and decreasing returns, the Equal Income Competitive Equilibrium tends to favor the eccentric preferences, whereas most egalitarian-equivalent solutions tend to reward the agent...
-
作者：Johansson, P; Palme, M
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Using a linear demand function, frequently used in labour supply studies, absenteeism is modelled as an individual day-to-day decision. The parameters in the econometric model are consistently estimated, using the (time-aggregated) number of days absent in 1981 as the dependent variable for a sample of Swedish blue-collar workers (both men and women), under some assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity and serial correlation. Implications of compensating wage differentials and efficiency wage h...
-
作者：Rosati, FC
摘要：The effect of social security on fertility and saving is analyzed within a non-altruistic model of intergenerational transfers, both in the absence and in the presence of a perfect capital market. Fertility is reduced by a budget balanced increase in social security if the individuals have a high degree of risk aversion. Savings are unambiguously increased by an expansion of social security, while the effect of a deficit-financed expansion of the social security system on saving and fertility ...
