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作者：Haaparanta, P
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper models international competition for foreign direct investment as a common agency problem using the theory of menu auctions developed by Bernheim and Whinston. In the model, national governments act as principals and a multinational corporation as the single agent. Governments are assumed to maximize the net wage income generated by the corporation's investment. It is shown that in the equilibrium of this game a high wage country may be able to attract investment even though all cou...
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作者：Schneider, F
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作者：Ghatak, A; Ghatak, S
作者单位：University of Leicester
摘要：In this paper we analyze the validity of the Ricardian equivalence (RE) theorem for a less developed country (LDC), i.e. India, for the period 1950-86. The RE theorem states that it is inconsequential whether a government deficit is financed by debt issue or by tax increases, since under certain conditions, the effect of government consumption on aggregate demand is orthogonal to the mode of financing fiscal deficits because rational economic agents consider today's deficit financing as tomorr...
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作者：Wildasin, DE; Wilson, JD
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Vanderbilt University
摘要：This paper reconsiders the implications of land-value-maximizing local governments in an overlapping-generations model with imperfect mobility. Specifically, residents develop an 'attachment to place' or 'location-specific capital' once they reside in a town for a single time period. The analysis shows that attempts by governments to capture the resulting rents from less-mobile individuals create inefficient migration, leave all workers worse off in an ex ante sense, and place relatively high ...
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作者：Skinner, J
作者单位：University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Traditional welfare cost estimates of tax subsidies for owner-occupied housing are less than 0.5% of GNP in the United States and Canada. This paper argues that these static measures understate the true cost of the tax subsidy. Increasing the capital income tax makes untaxed housing more valuable, delivering a windfall bonus to existing homeowners at the expense of future generations. This intergenerational transfer has real efficiency effects in the presence of pre-existing tax distortions. W...
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作者：Andersson, F
摘要：This paper develops a model of taxation with asymmetric information between the worker and the employer as well as between the worker and the tax collector. We show that if the informational asymmetry in the labour market is solved through signaling, implications for taxation are strong. Taxing the signal directly, as well as imposing a progressive tax on income, are both shown to have favourable welfare consequences locally. In contrast to the results obtained for the progressive income tax, ...
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作者：Bossert, W
作者单位：University of Waterloo
摘要：It is well-known that the Kaldor compensation test can be inconsistent in the sense that it leads to contradictory or cyclical recommendations in some situations. This paper shows that there is a close relationship between the consistency of this test and the rationalizability of choices from given utility possibilities sets. This observation suggests that if the Kaldor test is consistent, social decisions can be made using a social welfare ordering in the first place. Therefore, the informati...
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作者：Atkinson, AB; Stern, NH
作者单位：European Bank of Reconstructon & Development
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作者：Auten, G; Joulfaian, D
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：This paper investigates the effects of bequest taxes and the income of children on the lifetime charitable contributions of parents. Using matched income tax records for parents and children, the results show a positive elasticity of 0.6 for contributions with respect to the tax price of bequests. The paper also finds that the income of children affects the amount that parents contribute to charity. The results show a positive elasticity of up to 0.14 for contributions by parents with respect ...
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作者：Epple, D; Romano, RE
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：Public provision of a service coexists with private market provision. The quality of public provision is determined by majority vote. Preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives. We identify two cases. In one, majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median-income voter is pivotal. Ln the other, a necessary condition for equilibrium identifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median. When equilibrium exists, a coalition of middle-inc...
