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作者：Kofman, F; Lawarree, J
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We examine a hierarchy formed by a principal, a supervisor and an agent, wherein the supervisor and the agent can collude. We consider a case where collusion-free supervisors are not available. We demonstrate first that it is easy for the principal to deter collusion by introducing a second supervisor and designing a mechanism similar to the prisoner's dilemma so that the two supervisors control each other. Since it could prove too costly for the principal to send two supervisors, a new questi...
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作者：Kirchgassner, G; Pommerehne, WW
作者单位：Saarland University; University of Zurich
摘要：This paper presents empirical evidence on individual income tax competition in Switzerland. Tax competition has some influence on the spread of people with high income over the cantons, and it is partly capitalised in dwelling rents. However, it neither leads to a collapse of public good supply nor makes redistribution by the fiscal authorities impossible. Thus, if tax competition works well in Switzerland there is no reason why it should have disastrous effects in a future European Union.
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作者：Laffont, JJ; Tirole, J
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper starts with a warning about the negative impact of plain pollution allowance markets on environmental pollution innovation. Stand-alone spot markets enable the government to expropriate an innovation by offering a competing 'technology' (pollution permits) that puts an arbitrary downward pressure on the licensing price. Advance allowances reduce expropriation but still create suboptimal incentives for innovation. They have the further drawback that permits are inefficiently used whe...
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作者：Campbell, DE; Kelly, JS
作者单位：Syracuse University
摘要：We investigate Arrow's problem for the space of allocations of public goods and the domain of profiles of Euclidean individual preferences. We allow some efficiency to be sacrificed in order to avoid dictatorship, but if independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference remain in force, then there is no social welfare function that permits a significant departure from dictatorship without a substantial sacrifice of efficiency.
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作者：Chambers, RG; Quiggin, J
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper considers a multi-task, principal-agent problem where risk-averse farmers possessing private information have two tasks, pollution control and corn production, but only direct incentive for corn production. Using a highly tractable reformulation of the standard uncertain production model, a general method for solving the associated constrained Paretian problem is developed and analyzed. The optimal solution is shown to obey a generalized inverse-elasticity rule, and the optimal solu...
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作者：Cummins, JG; Hassett, KA; Hubbard, RG
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use firm-level panel data to explore the extent to which fixed investment responds to tax reforms in 14 OECD countries. Previous studies have often found that investment does not respond to changes in the marginal cost of investment. We identify some of the factors responsible for this finding, and employ an estimation procedure that sidesteps the most important of them. In so doing, we find evidence of statistically and economically significant investment responses to tax changes in 12 of ...
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作者：Eriksson, C
摘要：This paper shows that even in the absence of externalities, there is a market failure associated with an endogenous choice between labor and leisure in a growth model with imperfect competition. The reason for this is that workers are paid less than the value of their marginal products, and therefore supply less labor than would be optimal from the viewpoint of the society as a whole. This in turn hampers growth. It is also demonstrated how this inefficiency can be corrected by an appropriate ...
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作者：Reichlin, P; Siconolfi, P
作者单位：G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara; Columbia University
摘要：We study an overlapping generations model with production, asymmetric information and competitive financial intermediaries. Social security may be beneficial even when it should not be used under full information, unless credit rationing emerges with pooling contracts. In this case social security could be welfare reducing even when the safe rate of return falls short of population growth. We provide a full characterization of 'constrained Pareto efficient' allocations and prove that, when the...
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作者：Bond, EW; Gresik, TA
摘要：When a government agency imposes cost-based taxes/regulations on a multinational with private cost information, it may initiate countervailing regulations by another of the governments with which the multinational interacts. We analyze the problem of optimal regulation of a multinational under incomplete cost information (via trade taxes) by multiple governments as a problem of common agency with adverse selection. By focusing on the game played by the competing governments we characterize the...
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作者：Gottschalk, P
摘要：This paper asks whether the observed correlation in welfare participation across generations reflects causal links or unobservables that are correlated across generations. If the correlation is spurious then reducing one generations' welfare participation will have no effect on the next generation. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics is used to estimate two types of models that explicitly take account of correlated unobservables. These models indicate that correlated unobservables are important...
