Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Parsons, DO
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(96)01578-2
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 183-207
• 关键词: Social Security; disability

摘要

This paper derives the optimal benefit structure of an earnings insurance program when a characteristic or 'tag' imperfectly identifies those unable to work. With a two-sided classification error, the optimal program is a dual work incentive system, with a work/non-work consumption differential maintained for the tagged and untagged just sufficient to induce the able in each group to work, and with more generous payments to tagged than to untagged individuals of the same work status. It includes premiums to program-eligible individuals who work, a price missing in the U.S. social security disability system and in earlier attempts to characterize the optimal disability program.