Competition and regulation in the taxi industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cairns, RD; ListonHeyes, C
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01495-7
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 1-15
• 关键词: Regulation; bonding; transportation; taxis

摘要

A simple model of the taxi industry suggests that deregulation of fares and entry may not be optimal. The conditions of competition do not hold in the industry, even approximately. A model of search, where drivers and riders search for each other, is presented for the cruising-taxi market. This indicates that equilibrium of a deregulated industry does not exist. Price regulation is essential, and entry regulation may be useful. In addition, viewing the medallion as a bond for appropriate performance provides another possible rationale for regulation.