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作者：Heyes, AG
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：When pollutants are 'persistent' and the polluter has private information regarding the occurrence of accidental releases and the cost of clean-up, we show that the penalty regime which most effectively protects the environment will involve penalties which are less than maximal. The extent to which these penalties will be less than maximal is, interestingly, a non-monotonic function of the persistence of the hazardous substance being handled, with the highest penalties being appropriate in the...
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作者：Picard, P
作者单位：Universite Paris Nanterre
摘要：This paper characterizes the equilibrium of an insurance market where opportunist policyholders may file fraudulent claims. We assume that insurance policies are traded in a competitive market where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from opportunists. The insurer-policyholder relationship is modelled as an incomplete information game, in which the insurer decides to audit or not. The market equilibrium depends on whether insurers can credibly commit or not to their audit strateg...
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作者：Kofman, F; Lawarree, J
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We examine a model wherein a principal can use an auditor's report to contract with a privately informed manager. The auditor can be honest or dishonest, a fact unknown to the principal who must thus decide whether to allow or deter collusion. Deterring collusion is costly because the principal has to reward both dishonest and honest auditors for refusing a bribe from the manager. Allowing collusion is costly because the dishonest auditors will erode the deterrence of the punishment. We show t...
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作者：Sefton, JA; Weale, MR
摘要：It is the widely held view that estimates of national income should be corrected for the value of the extracted exhaustible resource stock. This correction implies the counter-intuitive result that the national income of an oil producer is unaffected by its vast oil reserves. In this paper we review the definition of national income, and discuss its relation to national welfare. We show that an extra income should be imputed to the resource-owning country based on the exportable resource stock...
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作者：Nechyba, T
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper introduces a theoretical and a calibrated computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental relations in which heterogeneous agents (i) are endowed with income and houses, (ii) are fully mobile between multiple jurisdictions, and (iii) vote in both local and state elections to determine local property and state income tax rates. Three different types of intergovernmental programs are analyzed: (i) redistributive revenue sharing, (ii) district power equalization and (iii) ded...
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作者：Madden, P
摘要：This paper studies two quasi-orderings in the context of three simple equilibrium models; a general equilibrium model with identical consumers, a model of an artisan economy, and an education model. The first quasi-ordering is induced by Suppes-Sen dominance (or first-degree stochastic dominance) amongst utility vectors of individuals, and the second evolves from generalised Lorenz dominance (second-degree stochastic dominance) similarly applied. It is shown how Pareto-efficient competitive eq...
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作者：Jack, W; Viard, AD
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：The attainment of production efficiency requires that tax incentives equalize pretax rates of return on different assets at each point in time. To achieve this objective, the conventional theory of investment tax credits (ITCs) prescribes significantly lower credit rates on shorter-lived assets. However, this result is valid only for permanent ITCs. We show that the credit rates for temporary ITCs should be much closer to uniform than the conventional theory prescribes. This result is robust t...
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作者：Mintz, J; Tulkens, H
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Toronto
摘要：Foreign source capital income taxes are examined from the point of view of optimal taxation. In the framework of a simple economy with international real capital flows, a taxonomy of alternative systems of such taxation is first presented, showing how crediting and other tax parameters induce what are called source-based, residence-based and related systems. Next, tax rates are determined that are optimal from a single country's point of view, given those of the others. The achievability of th...
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作者：Petrakis, E; Xepapadeas, A
作者单位：University of Crete; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are identified as environmentally conscious countries. Conditions are examined under which they can provide self-financing side payments too a second group of less environmentally conscious countries, so that the two groups form a global or partial stable coalition that agrees to reduce emissions. A mechanism that detects cheating is also developed in order to induce the desired emissions even when the e...
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作者：Falkinger, J
摘要：This paper proposes the following incentive scheme for the private provision of public goods: government should reward and penalize deviations from the mean contribution by an appropriate factor. This makes efficient contribution individually rational even if individuals see through the government budget constraint.
