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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Cornell University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper studies Pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with finitely-lived individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov process. The study yields three main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, in any period the only individuals whose earnings are distorted are those who currently are and have always been low ability. In addition, the degree to which these perpetual low ability types have their earnings distorted decreases over t...
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作者：Bracht, Juergen; Figuieres, Charles; Ratto, Marisa
作者单位：INRAE; Institut Agro; Montpellier SupAgro; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Montpellier; University of Aberdeen
摘要：We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents' contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechan...
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作者：Mishra, Prachi; Subramanian, Arvind; Topalova, Petia
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; Peterson Institute for International Economics; International Monetary Fund
摘要：We examine the effect of tariff policies on evasion of customs duties, in the context of the trade reform in India of the 1990s. By exploiting the variation in tariff rates across time and products, we identify a robust positive elasticity of evasion with respect to tariffs. A second contribution of the paper is to provide some evidence on the impact of enforcement. While we cannot identify the direct impact of enforcement on evasion, we can establish the extent to which enforcement-related fa...
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作者：Alpizar, Francisco; Carlsson, Fredrik; Johansson-Stenman, Olof
作者单位：University of Gothenburg; CATIE - Centro Agronomico Tropical de Investigacion y Ensenanza
摘要：We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary contributions, based on a natural field experiment conducted at a national park in Costa Rica. Contributions made in public in front of the solicitor are 25% higher than contributions made in private. Giving subjects a small gift before requesting a contribution increases the likelihood of a positive contribution. At the same time, the conditional contribution decreases. The total effect of giving a gift is positiv...
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作者：Eggert, Wolfgang; Sorensen, Peter Birch
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Paderborn; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We set up a probabilistic voting model to explore the hypothesis that tax competition improves public sector efficiency and social welfare. In the absence of tax base mobility, distortions in the political process induce vote-maximising politicians to create rents to public sector employees. Allowing tax base mobility may be welfare-enhancing up to a point, because the ensuing tax competition will reduce rents. However, if tax competition is carried too far, it will reduce welfare by causing a...
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作者：Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myma
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn brings about a loss of efficiency. In this environment, a 'minimum tax' counters the reduction in the intensity of tax competition, thereby enhancing efficiency. 'Split-the-difference' tax harmonization also potentially enhances efficiency but would not be agreed upon by gover...
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作者：Baroni, David P.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper presents a theory of corporate social responsibility in the form of the private provision of public goods and private redistribution by a firm. These social expenditures are determined by a manager operating under a compensation contract chosen by shareholders in a capital market that prices social expenditures. The theory incorporates three explanations for compensation systems that encompass social performance. First, consumers may reward the firm for its social expenditures; seco...
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作者：Berman, Eli; Laitin, David D.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：Can rational models, once theological explanations are discredited, explain why certain radical religious rebels are so successful in perpetrating suicide attacks? The fundamental barrier to success turns out not to be recruiting suicide attackers; there is a rational basis for volunteering. Rather, the barrier is the danger of other operatives defecting. A club model, portraying voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of local public goods, explains how they weed out potentia...
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作者：Henry, Emeric
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study a collective decision making environment where an agenda setter makes strategic proposals to privately informed voters who vote strategically. We show that, consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the agenda setter to propose supermajorities. Due to an informational role that we unveil, optimal supermajorities can be less costly than minimum winning coalitions, even though more voters are awarded a positive share. We also examine consequences in terms of quality of d...
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作者：Bovenberg, A. Lans; Goulder, Lawrence H.; Jacobsen, Mark R.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tilburg University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. We apply a numerically solved general equilibrium model to compare the incidence and costs of emissions taxes, fuel (intermediate input) taxes, performance standards and mandated technologies in the absence and presence of this compensation req...
