Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bracht, Juergen; Figuieres, Charles; Ratto, Marisa
• 署名单位: INRAE; Institut Agro; Montpellier SupAgro; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Montpellier; University of Aberdeen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 54-90
• 关键词: Public goods; voluntary provision; incentive mechanisms

摘要

We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents' contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.