The informational role of supermajorities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Henry, Emeric
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.04.003
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 2225-2239
• 关键词: private information; Aggregation of information in elections; Legislative bargaining; Supermajorities; Debates

摘要

We study a collective decision making environment where an agenda setter makes strategic proposals to privately informed voters who vote strategically. We show that, consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the agenda setter to propose supermajorities. Due to an informational role that we unveil, optimal supermajorities can be less costly than minimum winning coalitions, even though more voters are awarded a positive share. We also examine consequences in terms of quality of decision making. We show that the introduction of a strategic agenda setter can lead to socially suboptimal decisions. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.